

Concomitant Illegal Acts of DPRK Designated Individuals and Entities

By Shawna Meister

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Individuals and entities that violate United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions often also commit serious breaches of state laws and regulations. The proliferation activities carried out by designated individuals and entities of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) can be detrimental, among others, to states' national security, integrity of national financial institutions, export regulations, or border controls. For instance, shipping of any sanctioned items or materials usually requires false customs declarations, by proffering falsified documents, or bribing of border agents. Concomitant illegal acts could also be associated with additional risks to states, such as the illegal transit of hazardous materials that endanger the health and safety of anybody handling such shipments, or in the case of an accident, could cause severe and widespread human casualties. Although states make efforts to protect themselves from potential violations of their own laws, it may be difficult for states to identify concomitant activities carried out by designated individuals and entities. This brief will assist by describing observed or inferred illegal and regulatory violations that may be associated with different sanctions violations.

1.1 METHOD OVERVIEW

In an ongoing review of all individuals and entities (e.g., companies, organizations, agencies, etc.) designated under the DPRK sanctions regime, the reasons and underlying actions for their listing were examined. Where available, supporting information for such designations was collected and analyzed, and any inferences that could be made in the absence of additional information for criminal behavior or regulatory violations were made.¹ Each violation was scored based on the quality of information supporting it, with higher scores given to UN and external reliable information (e.g., authoritative media reports). These data were then analyzed for

¹ Refer to the Consolidated UNSC Sanctions list of designated individuals and entities under the DPRK regime (listed as KPi and KPe within the document) here:
<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list>. Various formats available.

patterns, such as common violations, common characteristics, strong and weak information, etc., as well as unique or potentially interesting observations. The results discussed in this case study represent a snapshot of data that were considered substantial information of violations based on UNSC reports, meaning that the patterns reported here have high legitimacy.

1.1.1 INDIVIDUALS

It is difficult to discern concomitant criminal patterns with designated North Korean individuals given the limited information UN documents have provided on specific actions that were viewed as enabling for violations. The marked exception to this is the often noted evidence in UN expert reports for a designee to be working for or with designated entities. Nonetheless, a review of actions by those individuals for which additional UN information exists reveals indications of concomitant criminal acts related to travel, diplomatic privileges, financial transactions, arms embargoes, trade, and labor practices.

A commonly observed sanctions violation occurs when designated individuals travel or live outside of North Korea. All designees are under travel bans and asset freezes, which means that they should not be able to live in a country other than the DPRK, cross international borders, or have access to financial resources. However, a number of designated individuals have been found to have travelled, or have been suspected of having traveled, through or into other states, while some live in other states.² The Consolidated UNSC Sanctions List indicates that a few of these individuals are using various aliases or multiple passports,³ which means that these individuals, and likely more, are producing or using falsified travel documents. Counterfeit passports either are issued by North Korean authorities with deliberately altered names and other identifying information or are illegally altered by third parties. In either case, the use of such documents violates national and international laws when used for any purpose, but specifically to transit international borders.

Some individuals with North Korean nationality or working on behalf of the DPRK's proliferation project are still able to travel despite not appearing to use any deceptive measures.⁴ The ability to enter or transit through other states may be possible if the state lacks border technology, infrastructure, or capacity to identify designees. Given the large number of designees (80 at the time of this brief), and that individuals are

² For instance, see individuals 1, 8, 14, 16-21, 24, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 46, 52, 56, 59, 61, 62, 67-75, 77, and 78.

³ Designated individuals 18, 21, and 30 are some examples.

⁴ For instance, see individuals 31 and 33.

travelling through states with a range of border capabilities, it is likely that some DPRK designees are also bribing border officials.

Individuals using false identification papers or bribing foreign officials most likely apply criminal strategies in other endeavors as well. While abroad, they may obtain housing, banking, telecommunication, and domestic travel, or international cargo transportation services – all through the use of a fake identity and with bribes, and in violation of national laws and regulations.

Another observation from the analysis of concomitant acts is the abuse of diplomatic privileges by some DPRK ambassadors and ministry officials while operating in other countries.⁵ Under the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, diplomats and other official state representatives officially accredited and serving in a third country, enjoy almost entire immunity to criminal persecution by the host state.⁶ This does not preclude them from abiding by the laws and regulations of the accrediting state. Nonetheless, some of the designated diplomatic staff have used their status to violate UN sanctions by conducting financial transactions on behalf of designated entities, procuring proliferation materials, or trading in embargoed items such as arms and related materiel.⁷ Others have been caught transporting large amounts of cash or gold in contravention of UN sanctions and national anti-money laundering reporting obligations, as well as to avoid suspicious financial transaction reports to a national financial intelligence unit.⁸ Beyond violating sanctions and international treaties while based or operating in third countries under diplomatic cover, designees' activities could include the breaking of some state laws or regulations. For instance, illegal financial transactions and the trade of weapons and other materiel while operating in official DPRK diplomatic capacities have been documented by designated and non-designated DPRK diplomats.⁹

Other types of sanctions violations, such as violations of asset freezes, arms embargoes, non-proliferation, or trade sanctions are also often associated with related illegal acts. Designated individuals that violate UN assets freezes and other financial sanctions tend to engage in related criminal activities, such as falsifying of documents, laundering money, or creating or using front companies, for purposes that are not

⁵ For instance, see designated individuals 1, 14, 21, 29, 33, 34, 36, and 44.

⁶ United Nations. *Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations (1961 Treaty)*. Vienna: Austria. (2005): Articles 31 and 41(1).

⁷ For instance, see designated individuals 14, 21 and 29.

⁸ For instance, see designated individuals 30 and 35.

⁹ See individuals 1, 14, 21, and 29. Also see pp 50 and Annex XVII D and E or UNSC S/2013/337, Panel of Experts report, for examples of non-designated DPRK diplomats shipping military equipment and using diplomatic accounts to hide financial transactions.

authorized by the registrar of companies of the host state.¹⁰ For instance, some designees representing North Korean banks or trading companies in China, have created front companies and conducted large financial transactions on behalf of the DPRK.¹¹

Designated individuals will ignore trade export regulations or undermine them with false declarations. DPRK supplies of military materiel to less stable or conflict-affected states may end up with belligerents, undermining peace efforts and contributing to further destabilization or indirect support of violations of human rights.¹² Some North Korean operatives may be engaged in additional nefarious activities that does not serve the host states, as at least one individual has been sanctioned for conducting espionage.¹³

Some designated individuals have also been identified to oversee and manage contingents of DPRK workers. In these cases, designees may not only be contributing to UN sanctions prohibition against the use of work forces to generate money for the DPRK, they may also be contributing to human rights and labor law violations. Cheap and unregulated North Korean laborer forces can depress national wage levels, create potentially unsafe industrial standards, or increase general labor unrest in the host state. Additionally, because the wages of these laborers tend to be controlled by DPRK diplomats, large unregulated cash transactions and courier services may result.¹⁴

1.1.2 ENTITIES

More UN information pertaining to sanctions violations by entities exists, which indicates increased potential for concomitant illegal acts that could negatively affect UN member states and violate local laws and regulations. Similar to individuals, designated entities commit violations related to diplomatic status and type of activity. For instance, some embassies are listed as the operating address for some designated entities. These are usually conglomerates of North Korean parastatals that may operate in multiple functions: as commercial agents for North Korea's burgeoning arms export industry, as procurers of restricted military materiel and commodities for export to North Korea, or as general contractors for other North Korean enterprises who deliver construction and other services to the host.¹⁵

The best-known example for such conglomerates is the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), designated in 2009, which exports/imports conventional arms, proliferation materials related to ballistic missiles, and provides general

¹⁰ For example, see individuals 35 and 77.

¹¹ See designated individuals 35 and 77.

¹² For instance, see individuals 27, 31, and 56.

¹³ See individual 40.

contracting services for civilian and military construction projects. KOMID has used sealed diplomatic pouches to conceal shipping documents to prevent the contents of the shipment becoming known.¹⁶ Given what is known about KOMID, North Korean conglomerates operating from behind diplomatic cover may trade weapons or proliferation materials illegally across international borders or in transit through third states, violating thus yet another state's laws and regulations and international transportation safety regulations. Like individuals, corporate activities operating under diplomatic cover violate state laws and regulations and undermine the integrity and respect for regular diplomatic interactions.

Also, similar to individuals, entities that conduct certain types of work will likely commit associated illegal acts or regulatory violations in other states. A number of entities act as front companies for other entities or use aliases.¹⁷ In order to operate, some entities are known to be falsifying documents, laundering money, using aliases, using illegal channels to carry out financial transactions, and possibly bribing local officials to conduct business. Some entities operating in less stable or conflict-affected states supply military training, weapons, and materiel, which could contribute to human rights violations in these states or further destabilize regions.¹⁸

States that use DPRK services might also be subject to violations of international human rights or international labor conventions if it is found that such DPRK companies are forcing North Koreans to work there against their free will. UN resolutions 2375 and 2397 prohibits work authorizations for DPRK nationals and require states to repatriate workers already benefitting from such authorizations. Yet DPRK-funded or managed projects continue to be operated in many client-countries with North Koreans rather than local workers.¹⁹ As this sanctions evasion technique is generally used to generate revenue for the DPRK government, it is likely that the DPRK workers are underpaid, do not receive adequate food, shelter, or medical attention, as well as suffer other labor law-related abuses. Furthermore, this activity generally removes revenue from the host state as the local and law-abiding labor force is not used, and therefore will not pay income taxes. At the very least, the introduction of coerced North Korean laborers can depress local labor wages. DPRK laborers and other citizens have also been found to be smuggling large sums of cash from host countries back to the DPRK. In addition to violating UN sanctions, such transfers may violate the laws of some states that set limits

¹⁴ For example, see individual 30.

¹⁵ For instance, see entities 1, 3, 16, or 44.

¹⁶ See UNSC S/2018/171, pp. 132.

¹⁷ For example, see entities 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, and 16.

¹⁸ For instance, entities 1, 14, 17, and 21 work in Syria and Sudan.

¹⁹ For example, see entity 50, Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies, which operates in 15 or more states, often using DPRK laborers.

on the amount of cash that can be brought into and out of the state, and undermine national and international anti-money laundering reporting obligations.²⁰

Entities that have been designated for procurement or sale of proliferation materials may be violating multiple state laws and safety regulations if the items transit through or originate/terminate in a member state. For instance, some entities are known to be transporting highly dangerous and hazardous materials,²¹ such as enriched uranium. In terms of administrative processes, these agencies are likely to be falsifying state documents, insurance policies, shipping notices, etc. as one means of concealing the product. In order to pass inspections, it is likely that at least some individuals, such as government inspectors or border agents, are accepting bribes to allow passage of the materials. Furthermore, given the secretive nature of shipping illegal items, entities may not take the necessary precautions, follow national laws and safety regulations, or abide by the rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for the safe shipment of hazardous materials.

At the time of writing, the most recent round of designated entities included companies that manage or own ships that have, or are believed to have, conducted illegal shipments of commodities from or to North Korea.²² These violations of UN sanctions likely also break the laws and regulations of states under whose flag these vessels sail, as well as national and international transportation and labor regulations concerning hazardous materials. North Korean vessels, or North Korean shipping companies, typically re-flag their vessels, sometimes multiple times, to facilitate illegal transfers of commodities (e.g. coal and oil/petroleum) or conduct illicit transfers of commodities ship to ship on the open oceans. The new vessel helps to obscure the coal or petroleum's origin from North Korea or the destination of other minerals whose delivery to the DPRK is prohibited under UN sanctions. Recently, some operators of North Korean ships have attempted to avoid detection by dumping their coal shipments in quiet, obscure ports, such as Kholmok in Russia, which may then be mixed with the local commodity, and shortly thereafter picked up by new vessels.²³

Operators of vessels or shipping companies carry out a number of diversions, some of which are illicit, such as changing the name of the vessel by presenting falsified specifications of the ship, such as International Maritime Organization numbers, insurance coverage, maintenance, and origin and destination of the ship.²⁴ These

²⁰ Mansudae, entity 50, is known for this activity and operates in various states around the world.

²¹ For instance, see entities 4, 39, and 44.

²² For instance, see entities 55-74, exclusive of entities 57, 60, and 71.

²³ See UNSC S/2019/171, pp. 37.

²⁴ For example, see entities 55 and 74.

activities may either violate member state laws or indicate very unusual exploitations of practices that are looked down upon by the industry. Some diversion strategies involve turning off the vessel's Automatic Identification System (AIS), obscuring its presence to national coast guards, ports, and other agencies monitoring state coastal waters.²⁵ International regulations require the operation of the AIS in order to facilitate rescue services in cases of emergencies.

1.2 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DPRK proliferation efforts go beyond violations of UN sanctions and have serious legal and regulatory implications for many states that, because of the involved complexities, often remain unknown to their concerned authorities. Government officials should assume that the presence of an individual or entity that is designated under UN sanctions, or closely affiliated to the designee, presents a heightened risk for criminal and regulatory infractions. The following recommendations serve as mere guidelines and should not be interpreted as a definitive answer to DPRK proliferation and concomitant criminal activities. The only appropriate reaction is heightened vigilance by all state authorities.

1. North Koreans or agents operating on behalf of the DPRK's proliferation program present general and specific risks to host states. Because of the heightened risks associated with designated individuals and entities, governments should exercise vigilance in all interactions in order to prevent a wide range of criminal and regulatory infractions.

Member states should investigate DPRK designees for potential concomitant activities. These could include examining financial transfers or deeper investigations of North Korean companies, particularly if using embassies for operational aspects. Less stable and conflict-affected states should monitor the movements of DPRK individuals, particularly if they appear to be operating in areas with armed groups.

2. Individuals designated under the UN travel ban that still attempt to travel internationally are an indication of potential weaknesses in state border control agencies and, therefore, also a potential sign for other border-traffic related illegalities. The violators' evasion strategies may affect from comparatively insignificant issues, such as circumventions of visa procedures including associated fees, to systemic abuses for the smuggling of arms across vulnerable

²⁵ For example, see entities 55 and 64.

State authorities should fully implement the UN travel ban and ensure that frontline border agents are well trained and informed about all aspects of UN travel by designated individuals.

border posts. State authorities will need to consider the different reasons for designated individuals to be violating the travel ban. Individuals could be travelling for purely personal and perhaps relatively benign purposes, or the motivation may be connected to far more deceptive criminal intents and purposes, that serve, among others, to reduce the host state's ability to track illegal or other damaging activities.

3. Some DPRK individuals and entities use diplomatic privileges to carry out violations of international and possibly state laws. At minimum, the impact on states is the limited ability to know what illegal activities are being conducted in their jurisdiction, while major implications could include the import/export of proliferation materials, weapons, or other embargoed items.

States should curtail the accreditation of DPRK diplomatic staff, including the opening of bank accounts. Diplomats whose purpose and mission are not well justified and who do not appear to participate in accredited diplomatic activities should be questioned and their accreditation limited to periods of time that are consistent with the official justification for their deployment in the host country. Diplomats violating UN sanctions should be reported to the UN sanctions committee on the DPRK, pursuant to resolution 1737, and, once designated for the UN travel ban, they can be expelled.

4. States may be held partially accountable for DPRK activities occurring in their state that could violate international human rights laws and labor laws when admitting North Korean labor contingents. Additionally, states likely experience lost revenues and depressed economic growth when DPRK entities displace indigenous labor forces.

States should enforce UN sanctions that limit DPRK revenue-generating activities, such as providing construction and other services, in order to promote local economic growth and reduce the potential for human rights and labor law violations occurring in their state.

5. The DPRK UN sanctions evasions concerning the import and export of restricted commodities can have a direct negative impact on states, the reputation of their shipping registries, the safety of their port facilities, and the safeguarding of international maritime operations. While re-flagging and changing ownership, registration, and insurances of a vessel are all legitimate operations, including frequent changes of destinations of a ship's voyage, national authorities should be vigilant. The authorities need to be aware that such actions may be abusive attempts on their jurisdiction by North Korean ship owners or operators to conceal their actions and may be part of an illicit commodity transaction.

To prevent illegal DPRK shipping and commodity trading, state authorities should verify ownership and operators of all vessels with particular diligence where suspicions exist that North Korean interests may be involved.

There are many ways in which DPRK sanctions violations coincide with various concomitant illegal acts that may contravene state laws and regulations. The implications of these acts may extend to safety and financial risks for the state and its populations.²⁶ States that enforce UN sanctions on the DPRK can contribute to reducing proliferation activities and other dangerous violations. But they also may be able to reduce criminal and other illegal activities that North Korea is perpetrating at the expense of their state.

Annex

²⁶ These concomitant acts are based on Panel of Expert reports and other supporting evidence, and are therefore subject to any limitations of the original information.

DPRK Individuals and Entities Associated with Concomitant Illegal Acts

Individuals				
#	Name	Affiliation	Nationality	Designation Date
1	Yun Ho-Jin	Director of Namchongang Trading Corporation and director of Korea Sobaeksu United Corporation in Beijing	DPRK	2009-07-16
8	Ra Ky'ong-Su	Tanchon Commercial Bank representative in Beijing	DPRK	2013-01-22
14	Choe Song Il	Tanchon Commercial Bank representative in Vietnam	DPRK	2016-03-02
16	Jang Bom So	Tanchon Commercial Bank representative in Syria	DPRK	2016-03-02
17	Jang Yong Son	KOMID representative in Iran	DPRK	2016-03-02
18	Jon Myong Guk	Tanchon Commercial Bank overseas representative	DPRK	2016-03-02
19	Kang Mun Kil	Namchongang Trading Corporation overseas representative	DPRK	2016-03-02
20	Kang Ryong	KOMID representative in Syria	DPRK	2016-03-02
21	Kim Jung Jong	Tanchon Commercial Bank representative in Vietnam	DPRK	2016-03-02
24	Kim Yong Chol	KOMID representative in Iran	DPRK	2016-03-02
27	Ryu Jin	KOMID representative in Syria	DPRK	2016-03-02
29	Pak Chun Il	DPRK Ambassador to Egypt	DPRK	2016-11-30
30	Kim Song Chol	KOMID official	DPRK	2016-11-30

Individuals

#	Name	Affiliation	Nationality	Designation Date
31	Son Jong Hyok	KOMID official	DPRK	2016-11-30
33	Ri Won Ho	DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID.	DPRK	2016-11-30
34	Jo Yong Chol	DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID	DPRK	2016-11-30
35	Kim Chol Sam	Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) representative in Malaysia, Singapore	DPRK	2016-11-30
36	Kim Sok Chol	(Former) Ambassador to Burma, KOMID facilitator	DPRK	2016-11-30
40	Cho Il U	Director of the Fifth Bureau of the Reconnaissance General Bureau	DPRK	2017-06-02
44	Kim Chol Nam	President of the Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation	DPRK	2017-06-02
46	Kim Tong-Ho	Tanchon Commercial Bank representative in Vietnam	DPRK	2017-06-02
52	Ri Su Yong	Ryonbong General Corporation representative in Cuba	DPRK	2017-06-02
56	Jang Song Chol	KOMID overseas representative	DPRK	2017-08-05
59	Kang Chol Su	Ryonbong General Corporation representative in China	DPRK	2017-08-05
61	Kim Nam Ung	Ilsim International Bank representative in Moscow, Russia	DPRK	2017-08-05
62	Pak Il Kyu	Ryonbong General Corporation representative in China	DPRK	2017-08-05
67	Kim Kyong Il	Foreign Trade Bank Deputy Chief representative in Libya	DPRK	2017-12-22
68	Kim Tong Chol	Foreign Trade Bank representative in Shenyang, China	DPRK	2017-12-22

Individuals				
#	Name	Affiliation	Nationality	Designation Date
69	Ko Chol Man	Foreign Trade Bank overseas representative	DPRK	2017-12-22
70	Ku Ja Hyong	Foreign Trade Bank overseas representative	DPRK	2017-12-22
71	Kyong Hwan	Bank of East Land overseas representative	DPRK	2017-12-22
72	Pae Won Uk	Daesong Bank representative in Beijing, China	DPRK	2017-12-22
73	Pak Bong Nam	Ilsim International Bank overseas representative	DPRK	2017-12-22
74	Ri Chun Hwan	Foreign Trade Bank overseas representative	DPRK	2017-12-22
75	Ri Chun Song	Foreign Trade Bank overseas representative	DPRK	2017-12-22
77	Ri Song Hyok	Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development representative in China	DPRK	2017-12-22
78	Ri U'n-So'ng	Korea Unification Development Bank (KUDB) representative in Moscow, Russia	DPRK	2017-12-22

Entities			
#	Entity	Affiliations (owner, front company, partner, is owned/run by, etc.)	Designation Date
1	Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID)	Second Economic Committee	2009-04-24
2	Korea Ryonbong General Corporation		2009-04-24

Entities			
#	Entity	Affiliations (owner, front company, partner, is owned/run by, etc.)	Designation Date
3	Tanchon Commercial Bank	Second Economic Committee, KOMID	2009-04-24
4	Namchongang Trading Corporation	General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE)	2009-07-16
5	Hong Kong Electronics	Tanchon Commercial Bank and KOMID	2009-07-16
7	General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE)	Government, Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation, Namchongang Trading Corporation	2009-07-16
1 3	Bank of East Land	Dongbang Bank, Tongbang U'nhaeng, and Tongbang Bank	2013-01-22
1 4	Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation	KOMID	2013-01-22
1 6	Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corp	Korea Ryonbong General Corporation	2013-01-22
1 7	Leader (Hong Kong) International	KOMID	2013-01-22
2 1	Academy of National Defense Science (ANDS)	Second Academy of Natural Sciences	2016-03-02
3 9	Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company (KICJVC)	Korea Ryonbong General Corporation	2016-11-30
4 4	Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation	GBAE	2017-06-02
5 0	Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies	Workers' Party of Korea	2017-08-05
5 5	Chang An Shipping & Technology	Registered owner, ship manager, and commercial manager of Panama-flagged HUA FU	2018-03-30
5 6	Chonmyong Shipping Co	Registered owner of DPRK-flagged CHON MYONG 1	2018-03-30
5 8	Hapjanggang Shipping Corp	Registered owner of DPRK tanker NAM SAN 8	2018-03-30

Entities			
#	Entity	Affiliations (owner, front company, partner, is owned/run by, etc.)	Designation Date
59	Huaxin Shipping Hongkong Ltd	Ship and commercial manager of Hong Kong-owned ASIA BRIDGE 1	2018-03-30
61	Korea Achim Shipping Co	Registered owner of DPRK-flagged CHON MA SAN	2018-03-30
62	Korea Ansan Shipping Company	Registered owner of DPRK tanker AN SAN 1	2018-03-30
63	Korea Myongdok Shipping Co	Registered owner of YU HYONG 5.	2018-03-30
64	Korea Samjong Shipping	Registered owner of DPRK tankers SAM JONG 1 and SAM JONG 2	2018-03-30
65	Korea Samma Shipping Co	Owner of DPRK-flagged SAM MA 2	2018-03-30
66	Korea Yujong Shipping Co Ltd	Registered owner of DPRK tanker YU JONG 2	2018-03-30
67	Koti Corp	Ship manager and commercial manager of Panama-flagged KOTI	2018-03-30
68	Myohyang Shipping Co	Ship manager of DPRK tanker YU SON	2018-03-30
69	Paekma Shipping Co	Registered owner of DPRK tanker PAEK MA	2018-03-30
70	Phyongchon Shipping & Marine	Registered owner of DPRK tanker JI SONG 6	2018-03-30
72	Shanghai Dongfeng Shipping Co Ltd	Registered owner, ship, and commercial manager of DONG FENG 6	2018-03-30
73	Shen Zhong International Shipping	Ship and commercial manager of St Kitts-Nevis-flagged HAO FAN 2 and HAO FAN 6	2018-03-30
74	Weihai World-Shipping Freight	Ship and commercial manager of XIN GUANG HAI	2018-03-30



Shawna Meister - CCSI Senior Contributor

A research and policy analyst, Shawna Meister has worked with CCSI since its establishment on various projects for the past eight years. Her background includes analyzing the role of United Nations (UN) sanctions in overall conflict resolution efforts, civil war in Africa and the Middle East, and enforcement challenges with nonproliferation sanctions. Recently, as part of CCSI's typology research initiative, Shawna has led the analysis of characteristics and activities of designated individuals and entities to identify patterns and links within and across sanctions regimes. She has produced numerous publications including authoring analytical and technical reports, case studies, journal articles, and has contributed to all books and nonproliferation manuals CCSI has released. Shawna's skills include multi-scale research project management and transforming complex information and analyses into useable products such as training guides, educational manuals, public tools and resources, and websites.